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Abstract 
Charity is often viewed as a paradigm of morality. I suggest, however, that charitable action is morally 
problematic – even morally wrong. Following a brief characterisation of charity, it will be suggested that it 
wrongly puts recipients in a position of dependency and dispensers in a self-congratulatory position of political 
quietism.  
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Introduction 
In this brief, programmatic article I want to propose something that will probably appear 
counter-intuitive, to say the least. The suggestion I want to make is that charity, far from 
being a good thing, is wrong; that charity is in fact immoral. This may of course be thought a 
wild, and wildly implausible, claim. After all, charity is among the cardinal virtues; and 
charitable work is widely regarded as paradigmatic of morally laudable action. In brief, 
charity is generally regarded as just obviously a good thing but that charity is so regarded does 
not mean that that is what it is. While this is not the sort of extended and thorough treatment 
necessary to make the case that I think is there to be made, my hope is that it may act as a 
sufficient provocation, to be countered, explored in more detail or of course both. 
So let me start by offering just one example by way of illustrating what I have in mind 
when I suggest that charity is immoral. It was recently reported in the UK that “Leading 
homelessness charities whose remit is to protect vulnerable rough sleepers have been passing 
information about some of them to the Home Office, leading to their removal from the UK” 
(Taylor, 2017). My contention is that the moral deformation this represents is not so much an 
aberration as something that arises from the function and form of contemporary charity. 
Recipients of charity are precisely on that account not fully people; they are less than the rest 
of us, and in particular less than those who offer them charity. The following quotations from 
the article speak for themselves: 
Howard Sinclair, chief executive of St Mungo’s [one of the charities involved], said: “The 
reality is that under current UK legislation, there are vulnerable people that are not eligible for 
support or housing and as a result are left destitute on the streets. When returning home is the 
only option for a vulnerable individual sleeping rough, we have to ask ourselves what would 
happen if we didn’t get involved. The stark reality is that without any intervention people 
would simply deteriorate on our streets” (Taylor, 2017). 
A spokesman for homelessness charity Change, grow, live (CGL) said: “Change, grow, 
live (CGL) do all we can to help rough sleepers to get help, regardless of their background or 
nationality. We work with a number of local authorities and statutory agencies around the 
country to reduce the risks faced by rough sleepers and find solutions to their sometimes 
complex needs. If employment or housing cannot be found for an EU national, we will offer 
supported econnection to that home country or somewhere they have relatives, and liaise with 
services there to ensure they have a place to go. When there is no other option and the person 
has refused reconnection, they are unable to work and cannot be housed, there is little 
alternative to them going back to their home country” (Taylor, 2017). 
Insofar as the slightly better off refugees or asylum seekers who are not sleeping rough and 
who do not need to submit to St Mungo’s or the CGL’s complicity with inhuman UK
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government demands, they are more of a person than those who are on the streets. Moreover, 
the people in that position may be sacrificed in the name of charity; they may be sacrificed to 
allow St Mungo’s and the CGL to offer charity to the ‘natives’. 
None of that, of course, is to say that everyone engaged in charitable work is thereby 
necessarily acting immorally. My target is structure, not individual intention. Nonetheless, if I 
am right that charity is morally problematic, then questions about complicity have to be asked 
about our engagement in it, in exactly the same way that questions about complicity have to 
be asked about our engagement in universities, school boards of governors, private health 
provision or indeed a whole host of public – and perhaps private – activities. For even if not 
all complicity is avoidable, it does not follow that such complicity is not morally wrong.
1
 
 
Charity 
Let me begin, then, by outlining what I take charity to be. Not that this is a matter of 
definition: as I have argued in another context (Brecher 2007, pp. 3–6), real things (objects, 
phenomena, movements, institutions) cannot be defined, but only described. That is why 
arguments about right and wrong, about what we should or should not do, cannot be settled 
by appealing to definition. If you think that that is a peculiar claim to make, consider a chair; 
and now try to define it. Can you do so? All that can be done is to try to offer as inclusive a 
description as possible. For the real world can always disrupt our descriptions: someone may 
invent a chair no one has yet thought of; new techniques of torture may be invented that evade 
capture under a previous characterization of the practice. In the same way, it is of course 
possible that in some world utterly different from our own, charity might not be what it is 
now. But that is another matter. What I am concerned with is charity as it is here, today, in 
our world. 
Any description of charity must start with the recognition that voluntariness is central to it, 
both individually and structurally: unlike paying taxes, one is not compelled to donate to 
charities or to work for them; and unlike schools, the police or the armed forces, charities are 
voluntary associations in the ‘civil society’ sector. Another way of putting the point is that 
charity is supposed to be supererogatory; while it is not a moral obligation, it is nonetheless 
morally laudable. Compare diving into a rough sea to save the child apparently drowning in 
it: you don’t have to try to rescue the child, but it is reckoned a good thing if you do. 
Hence charity, for all that its roots lie in ancient traditions, is in its contemporary form a 
creature of the modern world, where individual and collective are carefully delineated. We are 
sufficiently autonomous individuals not to have to do what it is nonetheless good to do; and 
while collective obligations – often legally enforceable obligations – have their place, so does 
the supererogation that marks us out as individuals. That is why, for instance, the medieval 
institution of tithes occupied a space somewhere between charity and taxation (National 
Archives, no date). In many ways, the Christian Churches’ system of tithes was very much 
like a tax, since (a) the Church was very often the local political master and (b) membership 
of the Church, like citizenship of a state today, was very much not a matter of choice. In other 
ways, however, the demand for tithes appealed (rightly or wrongly; realistically or otherwise; 
cynically or sincerely) to an understanding of the system of tithes as voluntary, as something 
freely chosen as part and parcel of one’s membership of the Church. To that extent, such 
giving was regarded as both religiously and morally good. Why this comparison matters is 
that it illustrates that what it is for an action to be voluntary, or freely chosen, is not a 
straightforward given. It is something that requires to be understood somewhat differently in 
different social and political contexts and under different social and political structures. What 
is clear, however, is that it is only with the emergence of the view that ‘individual’ and ‘social’ 
                                                        
1
 For recent interdisciplinary discussion of the complex ramifications of complicity, see Afxentiou, A., Dunford , 
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Brought to you by | University of Brighton
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/20/18 11:07 AM
 99 
 
are fundamentally distinct that voluntariness can be understood in the way it is today, here in 
Europe; and that it can come to take on the importance that is accorded it.
2
 J. S. Mill’s famous 
claim would have been unintelligible in, say, 13
th
 century Europe: The human faculties of 
perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are 
exercised only in making a choice (Mill, 1989, p. 59). Of course, it is charity’s voluntariness 
that makes it attractive: you are not compelled to give to charity; and charities, unlike state 
institutions, do not have to exist. Charity is supererogatory: it is at once more than you have to 
do and more than there has to be. Charity is not in any way obligatory; it is neither legally nor 
morally required. That is its point. While it may be morally admirable, it is not morally 
obligatory. You have to refrain from committing murder; but you do not have to give to 
charity. Killing someone for fun is clearly wrong; not giving to charity is not (obviously) 
morally impermissible. 
All this gives rise to some interesting issues of detail. Consider, famously, Peter Singer. He 
thinks that everyone should give 10% of their income to charity; but even he does not think 
that this should be compulsory, rather than a matter of donation (though, in his case, that 
caveat may be a utilitarian one to do with consequential side effects rather than one 
concerning the logic of charity).
3
 For if charitable giving were morally mandatory, then of 
course, it would no longer be a charitable act, just because it would no longer be voluntary. 
Moral obligations, on the other hand, are not obligations that are simply voluntarily accepted; 
rather, they are required obligations – and according to some, rationally required. This raises 
of course a particularly controversial issue about the ‘voluntariness’ of morally mandated 
actions. As Kant famously insists, we should not be coerced by other people; but nonetheless, 
freedom consists in following the moral, that is to say the rational, law. But however one 
might wish to unpack the set of issues this raises, the central point remains and remains 
whether or not one sides with Kant about the nature of moral action that while charity is 
voluntary, saving a child apparently drowning in a shallow stream (at little or no cost to 
oneself, and other things being equal) is not. In short: if legally required, then charitable 
donation is a tax; if morally required, then charitable donation is not supererogatory. Again: 
compare a brave and morally admirable act, such as going into the proverbial burning house 
to rescue someone. If you do not rush into the house, that does not make you a moral pariah. 
Rescuing someone in those circumstances is supererogatory and that is what both giving to 
charity and working for charity are like. Neither resemble the sort of classic “child drowning 
in a shallow stream” case mentioned earlier: if you are walking beside a shallow stream and 
see a toddler in difficulty, you have to do something about it; simply to walk on would indeed 
make you a moral pariah, even if you were phobic about streams and could do no more than 
call for help.  
It is this sort of case that raises the issue of borderlines. For example, is giving money to a 
famine relief organisation, or giving something warm to a homeless person on the street in the 
middle of a cold and wet winter, an act of charity? The obvious answer is that of course it is; 
that these are in fact paradigmatic instances of charity. But suppose that you are the only 
person around who can easily afford to give money, or the only person around who has spare 
warm clothes. And suppose that the needs in question are urgent. Then you might suppose 
that it is morally obligatory to give money or donate warm clothes.  
It seems to me that the more morally required one takes such an act to be, the less it is to 
be understood as a charitable act. Compare again giving money to a beggar on the street. As I 
have suggested, one might entirely reasonably suppose that this is not something one is 
morally obliged to do, however admirable – possibly morally admirable – it might be to do so. 
But one might not think that: one might instead suppose that there is a moral obligation to 
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give every beggar some money to the point where one cannot afford to do so. In that case – 
which is basically Singer’s position – then it seems to me that one does not actually regard 
giving the beggar money as an act of charity at all, but rather that one supposes it to be a 
matter of moral obligation. Charity, that is to say, borders on being a moral demand without 
finally becoming such. 
 
Charity and dependency 
What I have just outlined is the source of what I take to be the moral problem about charity. 
Because charity is not morally required, it cannot avoid being a problem for the recipient of 
charity. Why? Because people receiving charity are thereby put into a position of dependency. 
They do not receive what they get as an entitlement. Note here that the phrases, ‘receiving’ 
charity, ‘claiming’ charity, or even ‘getting’ charity do not seem quite right. This should not 
be surprising. After all, charity – unlike welfare – is something people are supposed to be 
grateful for. Now, gratitude is of course fine – in its place. A friend sends me a book as a 
present: I am grateful. There is nothing mysterious here. Gratitude is an entirely appropriate 
response to a gift. But as a response to charitable provision? 
Certainly it is the case that charitable giving is often understood as a sort of gift-giving. 
And this seems right: you give money or time to people who need it. But although this seems 
right, it is not. While charity might look like a gift, it is in fact something quite different. 
There are two respects in which this is so, and they are closely related. Both centre on 
people’s needs. The first, and I think fundamental, point is that responding to a person’s need 
differs from giving them a present; the second, which derives from the former, considers how 
responding to a person’s need – since needs are necessities, and thus in a sense objective in a 
way that desires are not – morphs on that account into responding to a real need one supposes 
the recipient to have, as contrasted with what they themselves take their need to consist of. I 
shall come to this issue, that of paternalism, presently. 
First, though, let us consider how giving someone something they need is different from 
giving them a present. The more that something is really needed by another person, the less 
someone’s giving it to them can count as a gift. It is precisely because I did not need that 
book that it could be (and was) given to me as a gift. But charitable giving is not like that. 
Suppose I were starving and without the means to get hold of any food; and then suppose that 
someone gave me something to eat. Would that food be a gift, a present? It seems to me that it 
would not, just because it was something I really needed. Gifts, or presents, are not things I 
really need; in one sense, I do not need them at all, and being given something I do not need 
is a constitutive part of the pleasure of being given the book. On the other hand, however, if I 
am starving and need food, then that food is not a gift. Gifts are things that could be 
substituted by other presents; a bottle of wine could have taken the place of the book without 
any loss of its being a gift. Being given food, however, when starving is not like that; here, 
only food will do which is another way of drawing attention to its necessity, which is exactly 
what a genuine gift is not. Of course, the starving recipient of food might well feel grateful for 
it. But that is not the point. Rather, there is something wrong with their having been made to 
feel grateful for getting something they need; and that is one way of drawing attention to what 
is problematic about charity. 
People do, however, tend nonetheless to think of charity in terms of gift-giving. If someone 
receives a ‘charitable gift’ then, surely, they ought to be grateful, just as though they should 
be grateful for a birthday present. No wonder the neo-liberal state couches its propaganda in 
precisely these terms: in the words of Her [UK] Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, “If your 
donations are under the Gift Aid scheme, your chosen charity can also claim tax back (known 
as tax relief) from the government” (HMRC). The very idea of ‘Gift Aid’ depends on 
conflating charity with gift-giving and so the UK tax authority’s statement exactly mirrors 
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government – and not just government – thinking. People in need should be grateful for what 
they are given. But charities deal with needs, and acts of charity address needs. So gratitude 
on the part of the recipients of charity is quite inappropriate, as many people who work for 
charities and/or who take part in charitable activities such as half-marathons in aid of such-
and-such doubtless agree. But then they should have second thoughts about charity. The 
upshot of all this is that either charity supplies needs, in which case gratitude is not 
appropriate; or gratitude is appropriate, and perhaps appropriately felt, in which case what is 
at issue is not charity, but a gift.  
So let me focus in light of that on the issue of people’s needs being met through charity. 
The fundamental question is this: should needs be met by charity? I shall approach the 
question from two rather different angles, although angles which are in the real world very 
closely connected: what is charity like for its recipients; and what is charity like for its 
distributors?  
 
Recipients of charity 
This brings us to the second issue mentioned a few paragraphs ago. It may perhaps be brought 
out by considering institutional charity: the nineteenth century British workhouse, for 
example, or today’s “overseas aid”. The logic governing the workhouse was this: people who 
are starving on account of being too poor to buy food are poor on account of their being 
feckless; on account of their not being sufficiently responsible to meet their own needs. 
Simply to give them food would not change that state of affairs; indeed, it would exacerbate 
the problem. For that problem arises out of what their fundamental need is rather than the 
superficial one of hunger: and that fundamental need is to become a responsible person. 
Furthermore, it is by submitting to the discipline of work that one becomes a responsible, or 
real, person. The logic of “overseas aid”, tied as it so often is to economic restructuring 
demands through the IMF or the World Bank, is exactly like this. Poor people’s fundamental 
need is to learn to be responsible and efficient neoliberal economic actors – anything else is 
only a temporary sticking plaster and in fact inhibits just those changes that are required 
because it addresses only the symptoms of poverty, not its causes. That is why “restructuring” 
the economy – that is to say, imposing neoliberal discipline and values across the society 
concerned – is required.  
Both examples have parallels with giving a young child pocket money but carefully 
circumscribing what they spend it on until they are sufficiently mature not to make feckless 
spending decisions and that is the model on which many of us come increasingly to respond 
to beggars on the street: here’s some money, buy yourself something to eat – but don’t spend 
it on alcohol. We might donate some tinned food to a food bank but can you imagine an 
alcohol or a tobacco bank? The point is that it is the donor who is the ultimate arbiter of 
another person’s real needs and while that is entirely reasonable in the case of a young child, 
it is to treat adult recipients of charity as if they were young children and not the equals of 
“donors” as adults. 
But even where that is not the case, where those who dispense charity do not take it upon 
themselves to make decisions concerning real needs on behalf of its recipients – and thus 
where the issue of unjustified paternalism does not arise – charity is nevertheless bad for its 
recipients. Let me indicate why. First, to have to rely on charity for one’s basic needs – or 
perhaps even one’s not so basic needs – to be met puts one in a position of dependency on the 
benevolence of others. And that at once reflects and creates a situation of radical inequality 
but it is precisely that inequality which is the root cause of the problem (assuming, of course, 
that the world’s resources are as a matter of fact sufficient to meet everyone’s needs, an 
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assumption that I will not defend here but that I believe is an entirely reasonable one).
4
 It 
helps entrench apology, shame and dependency in terms of recognition as a person. Moreover, 
to go back to some of the earlier discussion, dependents have to show gratitude, however 
illogically. They have to perform their lives, not to live them. That is why you cannot give a 
present to a person who is dependent on charity – they are not properly a person. In short, 
recipients of charity, even of unconditional charity, cannot be the equals of donors, just 
because they are dependent on the latter. This is not an argument against our being dependent 
on one another – we are5 – but an argument against anyone being fundamentally dependent on 
others’ benevolence, that is to say on the contingent convictions, preferences or whims of 
others (however sincere). It is why Kant insisted that an action performed out of benevolence 
could not be a moral action at all. And he was right. 
 
Dispensers of charity 
I shall end by gesturing in the direction of arguments about how engaging in charity might 
adversely affect those doing so, namely the dispensers of charity; that is to say, how it may 
adversely affect us. As in many other cases, the effects of actions on the actors concerned are 
all too often overlooked: compare for instance, capital punishment, imprisonment or 
interrogational torture (Brecher, 2007, pp. 68–72). Four issues, again inter-related, come 
immediately to mind; doubtless there are others. First, there is the issue of the extent to which 
being in a position to dispense charity (and ‘dispense’ is deliberately a loaded term here) may 
all too readily feed our egoism. In making us feel we are doing something good, it makes us 
feel virtuous; we are better people than those who do not give to charity. Second, it may too 
easily serve to salve our consciences by encouraging us to think we are doing all that can be 
done to make the world a better place – when that is not the case. Perhaps we should be doing 
something harder and something, moreover, that is much less clearly virtuous, namely 
fomenting political change. Of course, these two things need not be inimical: we could do 
both, and many do.
6
 But my worry remains the weight of charitable activity as compared to 
political activity; and particularly in structural terms. It is not so much individual psychology 
that is the problem, as the sheer political weight of charity, both individual and institutional. 
Finally, that weight itself tends, I think, to foster both a naïve optimism about the sort of place 
the world is and, closely associated with that, the self-delusion – both individual and social – 
that is necessary to maintain such optimism. Think, for example, about the SOAS (University 
of London) report of 2014 on Fair Trade which showed how “wages on officially certified 
markets are below what is paid by comparable employers” (Vidal & Provost, 2014). Yet “Fair 
Trade” continues to be celebrated as a progressive cause, naïve and self-delusory as that is. 
 
A provisional conclusion 
Some or all of these moral failings might well be forgivable – unavoidable, even. Certainly 
they characterize a good many features of our society other than charity. But that does not 
exonerate us. We are complicit in something that is wrong. It may be less seriously and/or 
obviously wrong than many other things but it is also more dangerous than many other things, 
just because it appears not to be wrong at all. In the end, the greater the moral demands a 
society makes of its individual members, the more problematic it is likely to be; to be a 
society in which individuals’ moral sense has to make good the wider deficiencies of that 
society and such a moral sense is increasingly likely to require a degree of moral heroism. 
The obvious example is that of people under occupation. Today’s neoliberal society, one that 
                                                        
4
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5
 See Alasdair MacIntyre (2013) for a marvellous analysis of our dependencies. 
6
 In the UK, War on Want is an unusual charity in being politically engaged and active, and in understanding the 
necessity of that to achieve its long-term goal of ending both poverty and unequal dependency together. 
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outsources its political obligations to its members and/or to others, and is thus reliant on their 
moral convictions and willingness to act on them, is on the way to becoming such a polity. 
Think of how we treat refugees in today’s Europe.7 
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